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the ‘Return to Religion’
Matthew Sharpe 
Introduction: On the ‘Return to Religion’
First, two vignettes
We begin with Tony Blair’s July 2009 Australian visit. Mr Blair
converted publicly to Catholicism in 2008. In Australia that year, he
argued that the West was facing an internal crisis of confidence, as
well as external threats. Blair warned in particular against what he
called ‘aggressive secularism’ and the Western tendency to ‘see
people of religious faith as people to be pushed to one side’.1 The
Australian’s ‘editor at large’, Paul Kelly, responded enthusiasti cally.
Blair’s position represented ‘the best argument against the rise of
secular intolerance and its distorting of history in the education
system by seeking to downgrade or eliminate religion in the West’s
story’. This stood in contrast to the Australian Labour Party’s ‘dis -
astrous’ distancing from the Christian tradition. Kelly styled Blair
as opposing ‘the fashionable Western idea that religion can be
suppressed or confined to the private realm’ as ‘a delusion and
dangerous’. The Australian’s position is not surprising, given the
news paper’s long-standing, US-influenced neoconservative position.
ARENA journal no. 39/40, 2012/2013
203
1 P. Kelly, ‘Blair sees the Real Power of Faith’, The Australian, 28 July 2011, <http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/news/features/blair-sees-the-real-power-in-faith/story-e6frg6z6-
1226102974094>, accessed September 2011.
In the 1990s, Irving Kristol, the self-styled godfather of the neo -
conservatives’ ‘culture wars’, was instrumental in brokering a
politically necessary alliance of the neoconservatives with the
evangelical Right. In order to do so, Kristol recurred to the old,
functionalist argument that religion is necessary for social cohesion
— a fact that he, like his teacher Leo Strauss, argues all great
premodern thinkers had recognized. Although most neoconserva -
tives were secular, Kristol reassured readers, many were becoming
observant in their public lives.2
Calls for a ‘return to religion’ of some kind are, however, not
restricted to the neoconservative Right, as Tony Blair’s Catholic
response attests. In the academic world, the Radical Orthodoxy
move ment — denominationally, a peculiar species of high
Anglicanism — is predicated on an acceptance of the postmodern
criticisms of modern political rationality, universality and institu -
tions. If postmodernism tells us that there is no truth or lasting
normative value, so even the natural sciences are one more
narrative used to legitimize certain power interests (‘just as
fictional as all other human topographies’).3 John Milbank, for
example, directly argues that this relativism relegitimizes the
Christian story as one more mythos in the marketplace of ideas.4 In
the light of real anxieties about the social cohesion and lasting goals
of later modern, liberal-capitalist societies and the failure of the
secular, progressive vision, the Christian promotion of the
substantive values of love, hope, charity and humility can seem the
only re maining source powerful enough to resist the reduction of
all elements of social life to economics. Here then we see the coin -
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2 I. Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, USA, Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1999, p. 368.
3 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, London, Blackwell, 1993, p. 15;
cf. p. 267, p. 358.
4 The locus classicus here is John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason.
For Milbank, science is just a particular form of narrative practice that has ‘theorised
internally its peculiar specificity, simply by concentrating on experimental knowledge …
[but] one can very often give different theoretical accounts of the same successful or
unsuccessful experiment’ (p. 270). ‘We simply cannot assume’, says Milbank who here
echoes Montaigne, Nietzsche and Lyotard, ‘that different cultural discourses are approxima -
tions to the same external (even if not independently specifiable) reality ...’ (p. 343). Rather, there
is a plurality of competing discourses, and theology must have the metadiscursive right to
‘position, qualify, or criticise other discourses’. Otherwise, as Milbank warns in his opening
salvos, ‘these discourses will position theology: for the need for an ultimate organising logic
... cannot be wished away’ (p. 1). The good news of epistemological and cultural relativism
is that a revitalized public theology need not feel that the alleged advances of modern
knowledge are any obstacle to the credibility of its metaphysical claims: for these claims are
no less or more narratival than would-be ‘secular’ accounts. Compare also J. Milbank, G. Ward
and C. Pickstock’s ‘Introduction: Suspending the Material: the Turn of Radical Orthodoxy’,
in J. Milbank, G. Ward and C. Pickstock (eds), Radical Orthodoxy, London, Routledge, 1999.
cidence of contemporary ideological opposites, around the motif of
a ‘return to religion’, which the culture wars serve to conceal. The
Radical Orthodoxasts’ promotion of revealed religion as a
repository of non-commodifiable human values today feeds
directly into the ‘return to religion’ on the post-Marxist theoretical
Left. Variants of this position (which position religion as source and
preserve of longed-for normative direction) have over the last three
decades been gravitated towards by many of the thinkers who the
corporate media would demonize as the relativistic sources of the
West’s loss of faith: people like Slavoj Zizek, Alain Badiou, Giorgio
Agamben, and before them Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-
Luc Marion and Jean-Francois Lyotard.5
The second vignette begins 11 September 2001. The flipside of
the emerging post-political consensus on a return to religion in the
liberal West is the positioning of the West’s enemy as fanatical adher -
ents to extreme Wahhabist forms of Islamic religion. These enemies
are wholly hostile to the modern Western way of life as led by the
United States, which is styled in their propaganda as ‘the great Satan’.
They are devoted less to any finite political goals than to the messianic
conquest of a global Caliphate. In response to the 11 September
attacks, on the other side, the United States, under George W. Bush,
set about invading Afghanistan and then Iraq. Bush’s motivation
for the latter military strikes — which cost over 7000 civilian lives
and led to continuing instability in the country leading to over
109,000 civilian deaths6 — appears to have been related to his born-
again evangelical faith. In infamous minutes from a June 2003
meeting with the Palestinian Prime Minister published by the
Israeli daily Ha’aretz, Bush indeed claimed to Abbas that ‘God told
me to strike Al-Qaeda and I struck them, and then he instructed me
to strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am determined to solve
the problem of the middle East’.7 Arab anger that the United States’
campaign had its own religious motivations were famously piqued
when the Bush administration named its Afghan campaign ‘Infinite
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5 This ‘return to religion’ in theory has been well documented, sometimes under the heading
of a ‘post-secular turn’. For a recent survey, including of Slavoy Zizek, Terry Eagleton and
Theodor Adorno, see R. Boer, Criticism of Heaven; On Marxism and Theology Volume 1 (of 5),
Brill, United Kingdom, 2007.
6 D. Leigh, ‘Iraq War Logs Reveal 15,000 Previously Unlisted Civilian Deaths — Leaked Pentagon
Files Contain Records of More than 100,000 Fatalities Including 66,000 Civilians’, 23 October
2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/22/true-civilian-body-count-iraq>,
accessed 20 November 2010.
7 E. Kaplan, With God on Their Side, New York, The New Press, 2005, p. 9.
Justice’, a possibility all monotheisms typically reserve for God.8
Yet Bush’s unilateral ‘hard power’ approach gained unanimous
support from US Christian evangelicals, many of whom (notably
including Christian Zionists) read today’s events in the Middle East
as signs of the end times; support Israel in the hope that once all
Jews return to that nation Jesus Christ’s second coming will be
activated; read the conflict in Iraq as fulfilling the prophecy of
Revelation 9:14-15 concerning ‘four angels which are bound in the
great river Euphrates’;9 and believe that ongoing Western hostility
to the Arab peoples finds absolute license in Yahweh’s curse on
Abraham’s illegitimate son Ishmael (‘He will be a wild donkey of a
man; his hand will be against everyone and everyone’s hand
against him, and he will live in hostility toward all his brothers’
[Genesis 16:12]). Since many Islamic nations prohibit missionary
activity, evangelical groups such as the Window International
Network, Samaritan’s Purse and the Centre for Ministry to
Muslims saw the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq as unique
opportunities to evangelize. In ways which sometimes angered US
military and CIA operatives, and drew strong criticism from other
Christian denominations, the United States’ 2003 campaign saw
missionaries armed with Bibles and proselytizing videos closely
following the tanks and special ops into Babylon.10
These two vignettes set out some of the peculiarities attending
the newly emerging post-political consensus that we in the West
need a ‘return’ to ‘religion’. Let me make three points on this, which
will lead into the particular focus of this article, eschatological
religion and its profoundly ambivalent political and ethical nature. 
First, it is usually left tellingly unclear by proponents what
exactly such a ‘return’ might mean. Statistical data continues to
indicate that a ‘return’ may be something of a misnomer, except in
a small number of Western European nations11 — for example, a
2005 Eurobarometer poll found 52 per cent of Europeans still
identify as theists,12 with 27 per cent attesting belief in a spirit or
life-force. Over 80 per cent of Americans declared themselves
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8 On this topic, see, for example, the essays collected in E. Qureshi, The New Crusades:
Constructing the Muslim Enemy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2003.
9 M. Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm, London, I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 67, and see below.
10 Kaplan, God on Their Side, pp. 13–15.
11 47 per cent of the French in 2003 declared themselves agnostic. Figures courtesy of Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Europe>, accessed September 2011.
12 Eurobarometer Poll 2005, <http://ec.europa.eu/public.opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_
report_en.pdf>.
religious (with over 76 per cent of these identifying as Christian) as
of 2009; just under 70 per cent of Australians declaring themselves
religious (63 per cent Christian);13 and 71 per cent of UK citizens
identifying as Christian in 2001;14 although decline in church
attendance seems to indicate a secular trend, in both senses of the
term. As these statistics suggest, liberal nations — unlike secular
closed societies — preserve freedom of conscience as a right. One is
left to conclude, in line with Paul Kelly’s remarkable labelling of
the separation of religion from public political discourse in The
Australian as ‘a fashionable Western idea’, that the ‘return’ here
means a return to religion in political life — with a usually
unspecified challenge to the separation of church and state in mind.
For, of course, Kelly’s ‘fashion’ here dates from the British
revolution in the seventeenth century: a fashion surely stable
enough for older conservatives to claim as a ‘tradition’. It is
arguably a foundation stone of the modern nation-state. More
importantly, it draws its justification from the need to peaceably
accommodate advocates of different revealed faiths, a social
exigency Tony Blair rightly observed is becoming more, not less,
inevitable in the globalized world.15
Second, the call for a return to ‘religion’ is also as necessarily
vague as the term ‘religion’ itself, including in the work of its most
virulent attackers, who often lump all creeds, faiths, traditions and
practices under one heading in order to designate the whole set as
‘poisoning everything’, to cite Christopher Hitchens — and before
him Chairman Mao. Any minimally observant sociological,
philosophical, theological, psychological or other study of ‘religion’
reveals an almost limitless variety of phenomena: a reality that
animates work today in ‘critical religion’. To take Max Weber’s
magnificent sociology of religion in Economy and Society as one
example, he divides the world’s religions according to geography;
class and status-group; different (or absent) conceptions of god or
gods and world order; different (or absent) conceptions of sal -
vation; different practical conceptions of ways to achieve salvation;
different forms of organization; different manners of proselytizing;
different sociotypical ‘carriers’ of the religions; different attitudes
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13 ‘Feature Article: Characteristics of the Population’, Yearbook 2009–10, Australian Bureau of
Statistics, <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1301.0Feature+Article
7012009%E2%80%9310>, accessed 10 November 2010. 
14 United Kingdom 2001 census, figures cited at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_
the_United_Kingdom>, accessed September 2011.
15 Cited in Kelly, ‘Blair Sees the Real Power of Faith’.
towards intellectualism, war, wealth, outsiders and the necessary
compromises of political life — the list goes on.16 There are worlds
of difference between Confucianism — a ‘religion’ which is neither
theistic nor salvific, promotes a serene indifference towards the
creeds of others, originates as an ethical code for the great Imperial
Chinese bureaucracies, and was so greatly admired by the great
anti-‘religionist’ Voltaire that he took it as indubitable proof of the
superiority of Chinese civilization17 — and contem porary
dispensationalist, pre-millennialist Christian evangelicism, to
which I will return in a moment. 
The third preliminary point here is a subset of this basic
observation concerning the vast differences between kinds of reli -
gion. It concerns the supposition of the neoconservative type of
claim that religion is necessarily an aid to social cohesion, economic
func tionality and ethical bildung. Most religions, most of the time,
have promoted foundational civilizing virtues such as ‘relation -
ships within the family, truthfulness, reliability, and respect for
another person’s life and property, including wives’.18 However, as
Weber and many other students of religion have noted, it is not
possible to say that religion by ‘nature’ or per se is necessarily con -
ducive to pro moting strong communities and ethical citizenship,
rather than forms of sectarianism which denounce worldly life, or
the religious convictions and communities of others, as nihilistic,
decadent, godless, irredeemable, even worthy of violent destruc -
tion. We must remember that particularly Judaeo-Christian religion
was born out of a felt need for consolation against the mundane
world, rather than from the need of governing classes to legitimize
their political ascendancy — as against warrior religions and
religions of caste.19 Weber in particular strongly distinguishes be -
tween forms of prophetic, charismatic religion, which tendentially
promote isolationism or outright hostility to secular economic and
political life, and more priestly, institutional, political or con -
gregational forms of religion.20 The truth in Weber’s observations
concerning charismatic religion’s anti-social, unethical potentialities
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16 M. Weber, ‘Religious Groups (The Sociology Of Religion)’, in G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds),
Economy and Society Volume 1, Berkeley, University Of California Press, 1978. 
17 On this, see P. Bailey, ‘Voltaire and Confucius: French Attitudes towards China in the Early
Twentieth Century’, History of European Ideas, vol. 14, no. 6, 1992, pp. 817–37. 
18 Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, p. 579.
19 On the distinction between religions of legitimation, and religions of consolation see Weber,
‘Religious Groups’, pp. 490–2, 412–15.
20 On this distinction and its socio–political implications, see Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp.
439–441, 457, 466–7, 473, 487, 528–9, 577–8. 
is of course borne out for us today in the post-2001 clash of fun -
damentalisms, to be distin guished from Huntington’s famous
‘clash of civilizations’.
In the light of these observations, I want to focus now on the
phenomenon of eschatological millenarianism within Christianity
in particular. The focus here has several justifications. The first of
these is that, while Anglican and Catholic numbers in Australia (as
in the United States) have stagnated, Baptist, Assemblies of God,
Christian City Churches, Christian Revivalist, Church of the
Nazarene and Churches of Christ denominations have grown
strongly since the mid-1990s.21 While theologians, scholars and
politicians debate or long for a return to religion, this is the type of
religion that has been growing. The next section presents the
overwhelming, interdisciplinary consensus about the deeply
intellectually and culturally regressive (and politically aggressive)
nature of the founding eschatological commitments of these new
forms of radical Protestantism. In the third section I will then make
three points (a theological point, an historical point and then a
sociopolitical one) that caution against complacent dismissal of
these religions as wholly barbaric in the way the new Atheists
shrilly decry, on top of the observation just made, that these are the
forms of Christianity that are growing today in nations like
Australia. The fourth section closes the article with a series of brief
inferences from the analysis.
Contemporary Eschatology, Contemporary 
Perspectives
The events of 11 September 2001 have precipitated masses of
literature concerning religious fundamentalism. Yet the continuing
rise and transformations of fundamentalist Protestant churches in
the United States has attracted a larger, much more longstanding
set of responses from scholars across a range of disciplines. One
defining feature of these non-denominational, Pentecostal,
evangelical denominations (including most Baptist churches and
the Assemblies of God, Australia’s third largest church)22 is their
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21 For figures, see <http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/17164.htm>, accessed September 2011. The
author is also not qualified to speak concerning Islamic fundamentalism, on which, in any
event, a wealth of studies presently exist.
22 For figures, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Fundamentalist_denominations>,
accessed September 2011.
adherence to some form of apocalyptic eschatology. Eschatology is
a broad term that simply means belief about final or last things, and
can include deliberations about the individual soul and its fate after
death. Apocalyptic eschatology, which interests us here in its
Christian forms, is the belief that human history as a whole has a
linear course, from a beginning (creation) to a final end. This end
(or at least its millennial beginning) is usually held to be imminent.
Sometimes, a date is set. So we are today living in the end times.
When the end or apocalypse (Greek for revelation or discovery)
comes, it will involve a great period of tribulation, which will last
seven years (Matthew 24:9, 21, 29; Mark 13:19, 24; and Revelation
7:14). Humankind will suffer greatly, and more will die than
survive (Revelation 14:1-13; 7:9). At some point, either at the begin -
ning, during or after the Tribulation, the pious elect will be raptured
up to heaven (the verb here is ἁρπαγησόμεθα, at 1 Thessalonians
4:17), Jesus Christ will return (Matthew 24: 29-31), and the
‘Marriage of the Lamb’ — or of Jesus and his faithful — will occur
(Revelation 19:8-10). Meanwhile, the antichrist will have appeared
(cf. I John 2:18) to unite his forces on earth in a sinister global
government, perhaps claiming to be Jesus but certainly profiting in
deceit. He will take Jerusalem, and perform the ‘abomination of
desolation’, by desecrating the Temple (Daniel 11:31; 12:11;
Matthew 24:15). The majority of the Christian fundamentalist
churches are pre-millennialists. This means they maintain that
Armaggedon, the final Holy War between Christ and the Devil on
the fields of Meggido in Israel, will take place at the end of the
Tribulation. It will see Satan cast into Hell for 1000 years, heralding
a millennial period of Christ’s earthly dominion (Revelation 20: 1-6),
alongside the living faithful and the resurrected Saints, a number of
exactly 144,000 according to the Jehovah’s witnesses. During this
period of peace the natural order of the world will be
fundamentally changed. Poverty, wickedness, corruption, hunger
and sickness will be cured in ways previously only imagined.
Nevertheless, at the end of the millennium, Satan will be allowed
to return, to go out to deceive the nations from all corners of the
earth (Revelation 20: 7). For a second time, then, Christ will wage
war with and defeat Satan, casting him for a second time, forever
into a lake of fire and brimstone. At this time, a second resurrection
will occur, of all those not resurrected after the Tribulation. The last
judgement follows, with all those found not written into the Book
of Life being cast into the lake of fire (Revelation 20:11, 13-15). Jesus
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then finally cedes world governance to God, who establishes a new
heaven and a new earth (Revelation 21-22), governing the
righteous who have avoided the first and second deaths (the
Tribulation and Last Judgement) from a New Jerusalem, replete
with the Tree of Life and no more death (Revelation 22: 1-9).
The basis for these eschatological beliefs lies in a particular way
of reading the Apocalypse of John, together with the ‘olivet
prophecy’ in the synoptic gospels of Matthew (24:6-28), Luke (ch.
21) and Mark (ch. 13); Paul’s Letters (for example, I Thessalonians
4:17; 5:2-6; II Thessalonians 2:1-12; I Timothy 4:1-2; II Timothy 3:1-
13; 4:2-4)23 and the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 1:9-11); together with
the Book of Daniel from the Old Testament (Daniel 7-12) and select
passages from earlier prophets (Isaiah 24-27; 33; II Isaiah 53; Haggai
2; Zechariah 1-8). Fundamentalism is usually identified with a
literalist conviction that the Bible expresses in direct language the
words of God. This is the basis, for instance, of ‘young earth’ beliefs
that the earth (or the universe) is less than 10,000 years old and was
created by God in six twenty-four hour days, in the opening verses
of Genesis. In one sense, you can see that fundamentalist readings
of Revelation or Daniel refuse any allegorical reading of the
apparently deeply metaphorical, symbolic or perhaps coded
language of these books. The sometimes super natural talk of
angels, beasts, horns, the second coming, whores, seals, trumpets
and swords emerging from the saviour’s mouth to smite his foes
are not taken to refer, however obliquely, to inner or spiritual
realities. They refer to future, historical events. In this way, the pre-
millennialist Christians’ apocalypticism is considered deeply
heretical by the Catholic Church, and most Protestant
denominations. Fundamentalist readings of these Biblical texts as
historical prophecies of still-future events (‘futurism’ as opposed to
a-millennialism, or, after the counter-reformation, ‘preterism’), it
must be stressed, found as little support in the medieval Catholic
Church as it does in the age of modern biblical hermeneutics.
Nevertheless, the term ‘literalism’ does not capture the way that, in
fundamentalist denominations — as well as in popular
fundamentalist books on Revelation like Hal Lindsay’s The Late
Great Planet Earth (which has sold over forty million copies) or the
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23 For example, R. L. Hymers, Jr, ‘The Prime Prophecies of the Pauline Epistles’, taught at
Louisiana Baptist University, Shreveport, Louisiana on 25 May 2003, <http://
www.rlhymersjr.com/Articles/05-25-03PaulineEpistles.html>, accessed September 2011.
likewise multi-million selling Tim La Haye series Left Behind— the
biblical apocalypse is positioned as a kind of hermeneutic guide
map to interpret events contemporary to the reader.24
Several particularly decisive events are looked to by pre-millen -
nialists in the post-World War era, as signalling that the end is nigh.25
The first is the advent of nuclear warfare, the prospect of which
seems to answer to the Bible’s terrifying visions of the destruction
of the world by fire and brimstone falling from the sky (compare,
for example, Genesis 19:24; Psalms 11:6; Ezekiel 38:22; Luke 17:29).
The second is the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel, then its
remarkable victory in the 1967 six day war — since, as mentioned,
it is held that all Jews must be ‘gathered’ into Israel before Christ
can return. With these ‘signs’ at hand, preachers and bloggers
compete in aligning different figures and episodes, as described
‘literally’ by John’s Revelation, with historical events: so Russia is
the ‘Northern Kingdom’ of Joel, Ezekiel and Daniel;26 China must
be the great army that will emerge from beyond the Euphrates to
wipe out a third of the world’s population (Revelation 9:16);27 the
European common market, the EU or the United Nations must be
the ten-nation confederacy in Daniel and Revelation, or perhaps the
revived ‘Roman Empire’ whose leader will be the Anti-Christ; the
World Council of Churches, perhaps the Roman Church, and for
some, even the United States’ own federal government, must be the
‘second beast’ who will proselytize for the anti-Christ;28 the GFC
must mean that we are soon to have a single world currency and
world government, as per Revelation 13:16-18; and so on. 
It would be very easy to dismiss this religious outlook as the most
barbarous and ‘patently infantile’29 of religious fantasies were it not
the conviction of over 40 per cent of the US population (58 per cent
of white evangelicals),30 and well over 100,000 Australians. In the
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24 Nor does it capture the extraordinary, peculiar attention paid in particular to numbers in the
text, all of which are charged with heightened significance. But that is not our concern here.
25 On the importance of the advent of the nuclear age, and the state of Israel, in shaping
contemporary fundamentalist eschatology, see A. M. Lahr, Millennial Dreams and Apocalyptic
Nightmares: The Cold War Origins of Political Evangelism, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2007, esp. ‘Introduction’, pp. 2–23.
26 Northcott, Angel Directs Storm, p. 64.
27 Northcott, Angel Directs Storm, p. 65.
28 R. H. Smith, Apocalypse, A Commentary on Revelation in Words and Images, Collegeville,
Liturgical Press, 2000, p. xiii.
29 S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), trans. and ed. J. Strachey, Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 21, London, Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 21.
30 Figures from <http://www.good.is/post/more-than-40-percent-of-americans-believe-the-
rapture-is-coming/>, accessed September 2011.
twentieth century, D. H. Lawrence wrote perhaps the most vitriolic
of responses to John’s Revelation, and the nonconformist churches
it has inspired. Lawrence’s claim is that Nietzsche’s analysis of the
slavish, ressentiment-fuelled origins of Judaeo-Christian religion
applies to this book, although not to Christianity or Judaism per se.
In what turned out to be his last published writing, Lawrence
describes John’s Apocalypse as ‘an orgy of mystification’,31 as
aesthetically ugly as it is luridly fascinated with bloodshed and
destruction,32 and deeply alien to Christ’s noble ethical message:33
For Revelation, let it be said once and for all, is the revelation
of the undying will-to-power in man, and its sanctification,
its final triumph. If you have to suffer martyrdom, and if all
the universe has to be destroyed in the process, still, still,
still, O Christian, you shall reign as king and set your foot on
the necks of the old bosses!/This is the message of
Revelation.34
Certainly, the consensus of modern scholarship concurs with Catholic
theology from Augustine that this form of eschatological belief in
the imminent, historical second coming is deeply problematic.
Philosophically speaking, it scarcely bears saying that Biblical
literalism stands in increasing opposition to modern cosmological
understandings developed since Galileo first spied the moons of
Jupiter, if not since Copernicus. Thinkers as different (but equally
open to religious perspectives) as Albert Camus, Karl Lowith, Karl
Jaspers, and Eric Voegelin have all noted the ‘elemental’ episte -
mological problem associated with assigning meaning to the whole
of human history, since we find ourselves within it.35 ‘The course of
history as a whole is no object of experience’, Voegelin observes:
‘history has no eidos [shape, idea, or purpose], because the course of
history extends into an unknown future. The meaning of history,
thus, is an illusion ...’36 Lowith rejoins: ‘for the critical mind, neither
a providential design nor a natural law of progressive development
is discernible in the tragic human comedy of all times ... all this is
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31 D. H. Lawrence, Apocalypse, with an Introduction by Richard Aldington, London, Penguin,
1975, p. 3.
32 Lawrence, Apocalypse, pp. 9–10.
33 Lawrence, Apocalypse, p. 13.
34 Lawrence, Apocalypse, p. 14–15.
35 The term ‘elemental’ is from E. Voegelin, New Science of Politics, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1952, p. 121. 
36 Voegelin, New Science, p. 120; compare K. Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. M.
Bullock, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, p. 272.
now past and has conscience against it’.37 To the extent that pre-
millennialists have made falsifiable predictions about the second
coming, our presence here today proves that they have been wrong
and wrong again. Most famously in modern times, the Millerites
predicted that Christ would return between 21 March 1843 and 21
March 1844, then, that failing, boldly revised the prediction to 22
October 1844, precipitating what is called the Great Disappoint -
ment.38 In our times, Edgard Whisenant predicted 1988, and then
following The Final Shout: Rapture Report 1989, 1992 and 1995. In
2012 Hal Camping set 21 May for the apocalypse, and was then
forced to move the date back to 21 October — incidentally at 6 pm,
adjusted for time-zone. The overwhelming consensus in Biblical
scholarship of the last two centuries is that the apocalypses of Daniel
and of John were attempts to come to terms with the Jews’, then the
Christians’, persecution at the hand of the Romans: the so-called
historicist or preterist position. The apocalyptic prophecies attributed
to Christ in the gospels looked forward to the destruction of the
second temple after the Jewish revolt in 70 CE, or else describe the
spiritual transformation wrought by Christ’s own ministry. Again,
the Catholic ‘a-millennialist’ position established since Augustine
in the fourth century CE deems all attempts at anticipating the
historical eschaton heretical. According to Augustine’s City of God,
redemptive grace had been bestowed in Christ and his resurrection,
in the past: ‘the Church is already the Kingdom of Christ and the
Kingdom of Heaven’.39 The millennium of the biblical texts is a
sym bolic description of the action of the Holy Spirit in the Church,
and the internal ‘destiny of the soul’;40 and while Augustine preserves
a view of the seven 1000-year ages of the world since creation, the
end of history is indefinitely postponed.41 Secular history (the
saeculum of all, passing time this side of the heavenly kingdom) and
the civitas terrenne or diaboli as such is devalued by Augustine.42 It
is a realm in which true Christians are as peregrini, in contrast to the
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37 K. Lowith, Meaning in History, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. v; see also pp.
5–6, where Lowith argues along Voegelin’s lines that to assign a meaning to History as a
whole is to assign it a purpose, which would have to be outside of history.
38 See J. M. Court, Approaching the Apocalypse: A Short History of Christian Millennerianism,
London, I. B. Tauris, 2008, pp. 119–22.
39 Augustine, Civitas Dei cited in J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, Stanford, Stanford University
Press, 2009, p. 80.
40 Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, p. 80.
41 Lowith, Meaning in History, p. 171.
42 On the meaning of secular as the passing age, this side of the new age of the rule of God, see
O. O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.
21–2.
inner drama of the soul’s fate in the world to come. Secular
government is of significance only in relation to the Church’s
salvational calling, as a means to keep the peace so the gospel may
be spread.43
Lawrence’s neo-Nietzschean diagnosis of the barely sublimated
resentment and aggression in apocalyptic books like Revelation is
confirmed in the now voluminous psychological literature on
apocalypticism in fundamentalist groups, as well as in politics
more widely. In his confrontation with paranoid psychotics like
Judge Schreber, Freud noted the invariable, messianic and
eschatological features of paranoid delusions. In these delusions —
alongside beliefs about omniscient, malign surveillance and
persecution by a, usually sexually, aberrant other — the subject
suffers from the harrowing sense that the world is either about to
end or somehow already has ended.44 The subject herself then is, if
not the messiah somehow charged by a higher, benign power with
repopulating the devastated world, then one of the elect whose
progeny will rebuild this broken cosmos. The isomorphism
between this clinical structure and apocalyptic literature is evident.
It is central to Richard Hofstaedter’s influential study The Paranoid
Style in American Politics and Other Essays.45 The consensus among
psy chological studies of apocalyptic thought is that these visions
represent externalizations ‘of internal mood onto external
landscape’.46 The externalization here is deeply regressive in kind.
Principally, it involves the over simplifying, Manichean splitting of
the entire world into good and evil,47 with a correlative
dehumanization of the other ‘as a perfect model of malice’ whose
final extermination attracts divine sanction.48 The vision is
characterized by ‘heated exaggerations ... in which empathy has
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43 Voegelin New Science p. 109; Lowith, Meaning in History, pp. 166, 168, 169–70; campare
Augustine, Civitas Dei, p. XVIII, p. 46.
44 See S. Freud, The Schreber Case, London, Penguin Classics, 2003. According to Freud, the end
of world delusion metaphorises a loss of ‘object-cathexes’, attachments of the subject to
external objects, and a retreat of libido back into earlier, narcissistic investments. See M.
Sharpe and J. Faulkner, Understanding Psychoanalysis, London, Acumen, 2007, pp. 121–5.
45 R. Hofstaedter, The Paranoid Style in US Politics and Other Essays, United States, Harvard
University Press, 1996. For the original article, see Harper’s Magazine, November 1964, pp.
77–86, <http://karws.gso.uri.edu/jfk/conspiracy_theory/ the_paranoid_mentality/the_
paranoid_style.html>, accessed September 2011.
46 C. B. Strozier and K. Boyd, ‘The Psychology of Apocalypticism’, The Journal of Psychohistory,
vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2010, p. 281.
47 Strozier and Boyd, ‘The Psychology of Apocalypticism’, p. 284.
48 Hofstaedter, in T. D. Daniels, R. J. Jensen and A. Lichtenstein, ‘Resolving the Paradox of
Politicised Christian Fundamentalism’, Western Journal of Speech Communication, vol. 49, Fall
1985, p. 254.
been leached out’.49 A correlative is the infantile, personalistic
idealization of all-good, charismatic leaders to whom supernatural
powers and insight are often attributed.50 The whole reflects the
kind of siege mentality evident in televangelist Pat Robertson’s
extraordinary comparison of the evangelicals’ situation in the
United States to that of the Jews living under Hitler.51 Studies also
note the rigid inability to accommodate the possibility of error,52
coupled with the as-remarkable ability (noted by Festinger, Riecken
and Schachter) to simply foreclose textual and historical realities
unrelated or contradictory to the ‘totalistic’, Manichean vision.53
Then there is the manifest megalomania of assuming oneself a
chosen elect of the creator of the universe, which has struck ratio -
nal ist critics like Celsus since ancient times.54 The whole complex is
suggestive, in Robert Jay Lifton’s terms, of ‘weak identity forma -
tion’,55 to which it appeals by providing an all-explaining, self-
justifying schema. Psychoanalyst Mortimer Ostow posits an
‘apocalyptic syndrome’ wherein apocalyptic prognostications are
seen to reflect a wider inability ‘to control rage, particularly if it is
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49 Strozier and Boyd, ‘Psychology of Apocalypticism’, p. 285.
50 See Weber on personalism, and saviour-worship as correlative to the declining social status
of constituency (Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp. 487–488), remarks which almost certainly
influenced his student Carl Schmitt’s advocacy of personalism in politics.
51 Pat Robertson, in a 1988 interview with a journalist, claimed that: ‘Just like what Nazi
Germany did to the Jews, so liberal America is now doing to the evangelical Christians … It
is the Democratic Congress, the liberal-controlled media, and the homosexuals who want to
destroy the Christians’. According to the Reverend, Christians were suffering persecution
‘[m]ore terrible than anything suffered by any minority in our history’. In 1990 Robertson,
responding to the Miami Herald’s criticism of his role in the Florida governor’s race, asked
the newspaper: ‘Do you also have a ghetto chosen to herd the pro-life Catholics and
evangelicals into? Have you designed the appropriate yellow patch that Christians should
wear… ?’ B. Wilson, ‘Christians Rewrite the Holocaust’, in Zeek: A Jewish Journal of Thought
and Culture, 1 February 2010, <http://zeek.forward.com/articles/116292/>, accessed
September 2011.
52 Strozier and Boyd, ‘Psychology of Apocalypticism’, p. 284.
53 The most obvious case, cited by preterists, is Matthew 16:28: ‘Verily I say unto you, There be
some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom’,
which of course speaks against any ‘futurist’ reading which would date the end times for
instance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. See Voegelin, New Science, pp. 138–40;
Strozier and Boyd, ‘Psychology of Apocalypticism’, p. 286.
54 See Celsus’ remarks reported in Origin, Contra Celsus VI 78. Translation is from volume 4 of
The Ante-Nicene Fathers published 1867–1872 and in the public domain at <http://www.
bluffton.edu/~humanities/1/celsus.htm>: ‘Celsus next makes certain observations of the
following nature: “Again, if God, like Jupiter in the comedy, should, on awaking from a
lengthened slumber, desire to rescue the human race from evil, why did He send this Spirit
of which you speak into one corner (of the earth)? He ought to have breathed it alike into
many bodies, and have sent them out into all the world. Now the comic poet, to cause
laughter in the theatre, wrote that Jupiter, after awakening, despatched Mercury to the
Athenians and Lacedaemonians; but do not you think that you have made the Son of God
more ridiculous in sending Him to the Jews? ...”’
55 R. J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, cited in Strozier and Boyd,
‘Psychology of Apocalypticism’, p. 284.
amplified by feelings of humiliation’ and as expressing vengeful
fantasies that target perceived oppressors.56
It need hardly be said that such a psychological profile or esprit
is hardly the kind that most of us would want our church or
legislators to engender, whether we ‘return to religion’ or not. As
mentioned above, Max Weber in Economy and Society already noted
the profoundly ambivalent relationship between charismatic,
salvationist sects and the mundane societies in which they
emerged. Norman Cohn’s classic study Pursuit of the Millennium:
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages
documents at great historical lengths the political and social
troubles caused throughout the medieval period by emerging lay
preachers, prophets and messiahs (like Tanchem of Antwerp or
Sabbatai Zevi) animated by a holy sense of living in the end times.
These figures’ certainty of their eschatological mission encouraged
them to openly flout the rules of church, Hallakhah, morality and
political society (with them often maintaining themselves by
stealing from Church and laypeople).57 They could do this safe in
the conviction that the time of these unredeemed institutions had
in any event passed, or would soon do so. As Landes has observed,
subjects who believe that ‘the future will be radically discontinuous
with the present’ will rationally enough experience a tendentially
antinomian ‘liberation from ... earthly inhibitions’. This is because
‘no fear of future consequences (except from a judging deity)
restrains the conscience of apocalyptic actors’.58 To be sure, writers
on the recent political turn of American pre-millennial funda -
mentalists have posited a ‘paradox’ between their conviction in the
strict dispensational predetermination of all events (which seems to
recommend quietistic withdrawal) and the active engagement of
the Moral Majority in US politics. While such extremely anti-
secular positions can and have led to isolationism, the paradox
seems overstated. It has long been observed that fatalism is con -
sistent with the most heightened worldly activity. This is the heart
of the historical connection between Calvinism and modern
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56 See M. Ostow, ‘Apocalyptic Thinking in Mental Illness and Social Disorder’, Psychoanalysis
of Contemporary Thought, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 285–97.
57 N. Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the
Middle Ages, London, Paladin, 1970, pp. 48–51. On Zevi, see eg. M. Himmelfarb, The
Apocalypse: A Brief History, Chicester, Malden, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 143–5; also the locus
classicus, G. Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism, and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality,
London, Allen and Unwin, 1971, esp. pp. 287–336.
58 Landes in Strozier and Boyd, ‘Psychology of Apocalypticism’, p. 278.
capitalism, so famously made by Max Weber.59 In principle, any
action that succeeds must ipso facto have been ‘willed’ by God for
such a mindset, whether this action is religious (for example,
converting or baptising a new Christian) or political (for example,
advocating to have creationism taught in schools, or more military
support for Israel).60 Evangelical preachers are clear enough in their
strident denunciation of Western liberalism and secular humanism,
which, it has been noted, very closely mirror denunciations of the
West by Qutb and other Islamic fundamentalists. Having turned its
back on the absolute authority of the Bible, the modern West is
accused of rushing headlong into hedonism and nihilism (the
amoral view that ‘if it feels good, do it’, as Robertson puts it). This
‘leads increasingly to ... chaos in society’, if it does not bespeak
Satanic conquest over America.61 On the basis of these premises it
is no wonder at all that, from the early 1980s, Christian evangelicals
began to feel a holy calling to enter politics with an urgent, radical
agenda.62 Just as Robertson created a storm on 13 September 2001
by arguing that the United States deserved to suffer the attacks,
because of its godless liberalism, Francis A. Schaeffer’s 1982
Christian Manifesto already openly justified civil disobedience to the
‘tyrannical’ secular order. ‘At a certain point’, Schaeffer reasoned,
‘there is not only the right, but the duty to disobey the state ... since
tyranny is satanic ... to resist tyranny is to honour God’.63
Considerations in Defence of Millennialism
I want now to temper or qualify these critical perspectives of pre-
millennial Christian apocalypticism, and put three arguments
against any too-complacent, new-atheist style denunciation of
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59 See M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism — The Version of 1905, London,
Penguin, 2002; also Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp. 572–4. 
60 Differently, Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein propose that political activism to restore biblical
Law in America is seen as necessary for evangelization — since as per Paul’s ‘Letter to the
Romans’, the sense of one’s sinfulness which animates repentance requires consciousness of
such Law, in ‘Resolving the Paradox’, esp. pp. 260–4.
61 Schaeffer in Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein, ‘Resolving the Paradox’, p. 262. On the
political turn of the evangelicals after the 1970s, see Angela M. Lahr, Millennial Dreams and
Apocalyptic Nightmares: The Cold War Origins of Political Evangelicalism, Oxford University
Press, pp. 187–97.
62 Members of eschatological groups, moved by their longing for the new heaven and earth
their prophecy imagines, must — in the absence of strong countervailing authority — also
be tempted to ‘press for the end’, to use Gershom Scholem’s term, used in the context of
Jewish messianism. See Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism, pp. 14–15. 
63 Schaeffer, The Christian Manifesto, cited in Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein, ‘Resolving the
Paradox’, p. 258.
evangelical Christian eschatology. The first of these arguments is
theological, the second historical and the third ethical or political.
The Theological Argument
Any fair discussion of evangelical Christianity, and its wider
significance in terms of the role of religion in politics, has to begin
by underscoring that the Catholic and other mainstream Churches
reject prophetic teachings about the rapture, and, differently, that
figures on the Left like Ernst Bloch, and liberation theologians,
have embraced forms of eschatology. Augustine, as we have
commented, aimed to distance official Church dogma from the
chiliasm, millennialism or messianism that was an undoubtable
characteristic of the earliest Christian communities. Nevertheless,
with that said, due weight does need to be given to the phenomena
Norman Cohn documents in The Pursuit of the Millennium, and
which are confirmed in histories of apocalypticism by John Court,
Martha Himmelfarb, Frederic Baumgartner and others.64 These 
are that the history of the Church has seen a recurrent need to
oppose millennialist heresies, false prophets and messiahs: the
‘Christ’ of Bourges in 591, Aldebert of Soissons in the 740s, Eudes
d’Etoille of Breton in the eleventh century; Henry of Breton,
Tanchelm of Antwerp and the pseudo-Baldwin in the twelfth.65
There was also the repeated need to tame the kind of populist,
eschatological enthusiasms manifest in the flaggelanti and the
people’s crusade.66 In Weberian terms, the Nicaean council,
stabilization of canonical texts, and adoption of Augustinian
readings of apocalyptic texts represent the transformation of
Christianity from an originally prophetic, charismatic, antinomian
religion to a priestly, congregational and institutional religion more
consistent with the needs of maintaining and legitimizing political
authority.67
Contemporary eschatological fundamentalism in the United States
of course grows from deep roots in that country’s settler culture,
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64 J. M. Court, Approaching the Apocalypse: A Short History of Christian Millennialism;
Himmelfarb, The Apocalypse; F. Baumgartner, Longing for the End: A History of Millennialism in
Western Culture, New York, Palgrave, 1999.
65 Cohn, Pursuit of Millennium, pp. 41–51.
66 On the flaggelanti, see Cohn, Pursuit of Millennium, pp. 131–2; on the people’s crusade see
Cohn, Pursuit of Millennium, pp. 61–8.
67 Compare Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp. 458–60; on Christianity in particular, and the need
to stabilize orthodoxy against a background of Gnostic and eschatological sects, see p. 463.
beginning with the Puritans’ lively conviction that their exodus
from old Europe positioned them as God’s new chosen people,
conquering a new promised land.68 New England’s Divine John
Edwards described America as the New Jerusalem, daring to hope
that God had chosen the new world prophesied in scripture to
begin there. John Quincy Adams famously depicted the American
war of independence as ‘the fulfilment of the prophecies,
announced directly from heaven at the birth of the saviour and
predicted by the greatest Hebrew prophets six hundred years
before’. American divines were soon to justify America’s first
imperial conquests in the Philippines under the Monroe doctrine
by recourse to the notion of a God-bequeathed Manifest Destiny.69
More deeply, we must recognize that the notion of history as
involving a linear course, with a single discernible meaning, is
deeply set into the West’s Jewish, Islamic and Christian heritage.
The fundamentalists undoubtedly read Jewish prophecy, and the
New Testament, in ways which are deeply ahistorical, unscholarly,
tendentious and motivated. It remains, however, as scholars as
different as Taubes, Camus, Lowith, Niebuhr, Jaspers and Weber
each note, that the idea of history as having a single meaning,
organized around the salvation of an elect group, is foundational to
Western monotheism. The last twelve books of Civitas Dei are
devoted to articulating a theology of history based on the six
creation days.70 Such a notion was foreign to Hellenistic and
Roman spirituality and philosophy. These held to a circular notion
of time as involving, equally, ascent and descent, growth and decay,
rooted in the supposition that the natural world was uncreated, so
could equally have no end.71 Scholars now agree in tracing the
lineage of the linear Judaeo-Christian conception of history back to
Persia, and the encounter between the exilic Jewish community and
Zoroastrianism.72 Whatever the origins of this theological and
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68 For example, R. Smolinski, ‘The Eschatological Limits of Puritan Typology in New England’,
in The New England Quarterly, vol. 63, no. 3, 1990, pp. 357–95; J. H. Smith, ‘“The Promised Day
of the Lord”: American Millennialism and Apocalypticism 1735–1783’, in Richard Conners
(ed.), Anglo-American Millennialism, from Milton to the Millerites, Leiden, Brill, 2004, pp.
115–50; Baumgartner, Longing for the End, pp. 119–132.
69 Northcott, Angel Directs the Storm, pp. 14, 16, 24.
70 For example. H. Kung, Great Christian Thinkers, pp. 94–98; also M. Russell, ‘The Political Idea
of the Christian Identity Revisited’, in P. Quadrio (ed.), Politics and Religion in the New
Century, Australia, University of Sydney, 2010, pp. 157–8, 164.
71 Compare on this point, esp. Lowith, ‘Introduction’, Meaning in History, pp. 6–10; also A.
Camus, The Rebel, trans. J. O’Brien, London, Penguin, 1971, p. 190.
72 See esp. N. Cohn, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith,
United States, Yale University Press, 1993.
philosophical conception of history, scholars also agree that for the
first four centuries of the Christian era — as some fundamentalists
have noted — millennial expectation of the immanent second
coming of Christ, with attendant transformation of human nature
and the natural world, was normative among early Christians. It
was expressed not simply in charismatic splinter groups like the
Montanists.73 Apocalyptic millennialism in different forms was
maintained by leading church fathers such as Tertullian, Justin
Martyr, Irenaeus and Ambrose of Milan.74 Hans Blumenberg’s claim
about the Church’s post-Augustinian stamping out of Gnosticism
— that it represents as much a reinvention of Christianity, as its
purification — thus applies equally to millennialism.75 We need not
go as far as Lawrence’s almost apocalyptic claim that the
Revelation of John had to be included at the end of the New
Testament, a necessary, almost obscene or superegoic ‘hidden side
of Christianity’ comparable to Judas’ betrayal of the saviour,76 since
Jesus’ ethical message could never hope to motivate the wretched
of the earth.77 As the book of Daniel, from which John draws many
of his images, shows — and now we are also familiar with the
apocalypses of Nag-Hammadi and those from the Qumran scrolls78
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73 Compare Court, Approaching the Apocalypse, pp. 51–6.
74 In the Dialogue with Trypho, 7 and 8, J. Martyr (d. 165) explains: ‘I and every other completely
orthodox Christian feel certain that there will be a resurrection of the flesh, followed by a
thousand years in the rebuilt, embellished, and enlarged city of Jerusalem, as was
announced by the Prophets Ezekiel, Isaiah and the others’ (emphasis added). Irenaeus of
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kingdom, that is, the rest, the hallowed seventh day’. Clement (I Clement, XXIII) at the end
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shoot comes, then a leaf, then a flower, after that the sour fruit, then the fully ripe grapes.
You see that in a short time the fruit of the tree reaches maturity. In truth his will shall be
fulfilled quickly and suddenly ... He shall come quickly and not linger, and the Lord will
come suddenly to his temple ...’ See D. R. Anderson, ‘The Soteriological Impact of
Augustine’s Change from Premillennialism to Amillennialism Part One’, Faith Alone, 2002, p.
26, n. 2, <http://www.faithalone.org/journal/2002i/anderson.pdf>, accessed September
2011. As late as the end of the fourth century, Julius Quintus-Hilarianus in De Mundi
Duratione calculated that the world had but 101 years remaining, cited in A. Camus, Christian
Metaphysics and Neoplatonism, p. 47. See, for example, Court, Approaching the Apocalypse, pp.
56–60; Baumgartner, Longing for the End, pp. 31–46.
75 H. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. R. M. Wallace, Cambridge, MIT
Press, 1993, pp. 127–36.
76 Lawrence, Apocalypse, p. 17.
77 Lawrence, Apocalypse, pp. 15–16.
78 Codex 5 of the Nag-Hammadi texts contains Apocalypses attributed to Paul and Adam, and
two by James. See esp. Himmelfarb, Approaching the Apocalypse, pp. 50–3.
— the apocalyptic genre and the human needs to which it appealed
are present from Christianity’s inception.
Historical Reason: Modern Secularizations of Eschatology
So, while the new atheists may laugh loudest at contemporary
fundamentalism, the roots of the kind of eschatological thinking
they develop lie close to the very bases of the West’s Judaeo
Christianity. We should be less complacent when we acknowledge
that many of the most powerful criticisms of the role of eschatology
in Western history written in the last century primarily targeted
modern political regimes. Karl Lowith’s Meaning in History, written
in 1949, is book-ended by telling considerations concerning the
advent of ‘modern Joachism’ in the Nazi doctrine of a millennial
Reich, and Hegelian philosophy.79 Lowith’s recounting of the
intellectual history going back to the Bible, of Western dogmata
positing a single, theological or philosophical point to history,
begins with modern authors: Marx, Hegel, Burckhardt, Comte and
Voltaire. Famously, Lowith claims that the modern notion of
technological and social progress, inaugurated by Voltaire, is a
‘secularization’ of the Christian theology of history — which
collapses what Augustine had divided: the hopes invested in
Christianity in transcendent or sacred history, and the secular
history of nations and peoples. Like Jacob Taubes, whom he cites,
and Eric Voegelin, according to Lowith modern apocalyptic is in fact
first expressed by Joachim of Fiore in the mid-thirteenth century,
positing three ages of the world culminating in an immanent age of
the Holy Spirit.80 At nearly the same time as Lowith, Albert Camus’
L’Homme Révolté was making the same type of claim, tying total -
itarian regimes’ sanctioning of preemptive war and mass murder to
a secularized eschatology, positioning the Party as the agent of
History charged with bringing about the promised, millennial or
‘post-historical’ kingdom.81 Whatever their flaws, the resonance of
these arguments, repackaged recently by John Gray in Black Mass:
Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia in the present debates
about a ‘return to religion’ is very important. The Radical Orthodox
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79 Lowith, Meaning in History, pp. 208–13.
80 Compare on Joachim, who emerges in these authors as the decisive progenitor of modernity,
Lowith, Meaning in History, pp. 145–159; also J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, pp. 82, 90–98;
Voegelin, New Science, pp. 110–114.
81 Camus, The Rebel, pp. 173, 246.
and consonant thinkers appeal to the ‘political theological’ claim
that modern institutions and notions ‘secularize’ religious
conceptions, to justify the inference that we should now, in some
way, openly reinstitute Christian institutions. But in Voegelin,
Camus and Lowith, with the memory of totalitarian illiberalism
fresher in the West’s mind, the secularization case was first used to
justify the opposing inference. Their claim is that it is the
‘secularization’ of religious eschatology that explains the worst
excesses of totalitarian regimes. This points, explicitly in Camus
(Voegelin is a more complex case),82 to the wisdom of maintaining
religious liberty, multi-party regimes and a separation of state from
church. 
Socio-political Argument
The fallacy of attributing a single meaning to history appears
‘elemental’, Voegelin observes. Its persistence hence calls for some
kind of explanation of the deep human needs or ‘drives’ expressed
in eschatology.83 Voegelin begins by noting that eschatology
answers to the inalienable human need for ‘cognitive mapping’:
what Weber terms ‘the metaphysical needs of the human mind as it
is driven to reflect on ethical and religious questions, driven not by
material need but by an inner compulsion to understand the world
as a meaningful cosmos and to take up a position towards it’.84 In
this light, Voegelin comments that ‘the fallacious construction [of
eschatology] ... achieves a certainty about the meaning of history
and [its believers’] place in it, which otherwise they would not
have’.85 Yet this account is, I think, manifoldly, insufficient.86 On the
one hand, comparative reflection on different religious traditions
shows that eschatology does not emerge outside of a culture which
posits a God who is transcendent, all-powerful and ethically
oriented, and which is then faced by the problem of explaining how
such a God could create such a manifestly imperfect world in
which the good do not always prosper.87 Put programmatically,
apocalypse or eschatology is one response to theodicy, alongside
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83 Voegelin, New Science, pp. 121–2.
84 Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, p. 499.
85 Voegelin, New Science, p. 122.
86 Although we cannot pursue it here, Voegelin shares a near-vocational overestimation of the
power of ideas in making history with several other ‘philosophers of history’.
87 Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, p. 519.
dualism and the transmigration of souls.88 Here the problem and its
solution are historicized. The unrequited, manifest sufferings of the
present time are either the justified response of the God to past sins,
inherited original sin, or breaches of covenant. In all events, justice
will be divinely restored at the end time, when the wicked will be
justly punished and the good inherit a transformed nature.89 These
tropes are absent from many non-Western religions.
On the other hand, any social intellectualist explanation of the
continuing appeal of apocalyptic eschatology will clearly be in -
sufficient, given the socio-political and psychological constituents
of human motivation. To take the, for us, foundational case of
Jewish messianism: different scholars have noted the direct
connection between this world conception and the Hebrews’ ancient
status in the post-exilic period as a politically disempowered
nation, successively colonised by the ‘four beasts’ of surrounding,
more powerful empires. Yet the hope for a mashiah, anointed King,
was for a long period not given a cosmological, supernaturalist
framing. Still, for a philosophical rabbi like Maimonides, messian -
ism — for instance in the Song of Solomon (Solomon, 17.37-8) —
expresses disappointed political hopes and a longing for vengeance
against the occupying powers, and looks to future political and
military solutions. The supernatural component to Jewish
messianism was developed only after the Maccabean revolt, with
the Book of Daniel (c. 165 BCE) arguably still a political tract —
necessarily coded in order to avoid censorship — and aimed at
consoling the Hassidim (righteous ones) who had been subject to
persecution at the hands of Antiochus IV.90 Gershom Scholem,
probably the foremost scholar of Jewish mysticism and
apocalypticism, posits a direct correlation between political
disempowerment and apocalyptic supernaturalism:
The stronger the loss of historical reality in Judaism during
the turmoil surrounding the destruction of the second
temple and of the ancient world, the more intense became
consciousness of the cryptic character and mystery of the
Messianic message ... Jewish messianism is in its origins and
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88 Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp. 523–26; compare Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age,
pp. 127–136.
89 Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp. 519–523.
90 Compare N. Moskowitz, ‘The Book of Daniel, Part I: A Theological-Political Tractate
Addressed to the Judean Hasidim Under Seleucid-Greek Rule’, Jewish Bible Quarterly, vol. 38,
no. 2, 2010, <http://jbq.jewishbible.org/assets/Uploads/382/bookdaniel1.pdf>, accessed
September 2011; also Himmelfarb, Apocalypse, pp. 55–6.
by its nature — this cannot be sufficiently emphasised — a
theory of catastrophe.91
Herein then lies my social or political criticism of any too blithe
laughing-off-stage at contemporary apocalyptic. It is all very well
for Lawrence and Nietzsche to attack the ressentiment or ‘slavish’
mentality expressed in apocalyptic literature, as if people might
choose their ethos in a social, political or cultural vacuum. It remains
for us, in contrast to this, to ask what else can we expect people
who feel completely dispossessed or alienated from the present
political dispensation to feel except resentment, anger and a desire
for vengeance against those they see as the perpetrators and
profiteers of this dispensation?92 Secondly, how (or where) else can
we expect these all-too-human feelings and wishes to be expressed
except in other-worldly, imagined settings? Finally, how else can
we expect people who feel so completely disempowered to
envision their longed-for-release as occurring except through the
intervention of transcendent, unforeseeable powers, wholly alien to
present political realities, who will come as a thief in the night (1
Thessolonians 5:2)? Of course, we are approaching here the
defences of religion to be found in Marxian authors such as Ernst
Bloch, Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer.93 We are also,
arguably, approaching the rationale (complete political defeat)
which explains the messianic turn in theorists such as Agamben, or
in Badiou’s notion of an indiscernible ‘truth event’ that will wholly
rupture existing epistemological and political expectations.
Pointing out the logical, rhetorical, fantasmatic and ethical problems
with apocalypticism will not only serve to consolidate believers’
sense of world alienation. It also forecloses consideration of the
this-worldly conditions that historical and sociological research has
repeatedly attested as underlying apocalypticism. This consideration
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91 Scholem, Jewish Mysticism, p. 7.
92 A reviewer of this article also pointed to the metaphysical consequences of modern science’s
overcoming of revealed accounts of creation, the origins of man, and natural-providential
teleology. This is a point well made, and made powerfully by Nietzsche among many others,
although it raises large philosophical issues we cannot address here. The modern scientific
worldview, when viewed against the background of theistic assumptions, can only look
‘meaningless’, a sense of ‘nihilism’ which can, has and will continue to provoke anxiety, and
the argument that only a theistic culture and worldview can restore meaning or direction to
the West. The claim of the modern West’s nihilism is of course a key dimension of many
radical right-wing evangelicals, as we have seen.
93 Compare, for example, Boer, Criticism of Heaven; R. Guess (ed.), The Early Frankfurt School and
Religion, London, Palgrave, 2005; J. Hughes, ‘Unspeakable Utopia: Art and the Return to the
Theological in the Marxism of Adorno and Horkheimer’, Crosscurrents, vol. 53, no. 4, Winter
2004.
suggests that apocalypticism and messianism is not simply, or even
primarily, a religious position characteristic solely of the lowest
socio economic classes — as in the United States today. It is, how -
ever, a species of religious belief whose appeal grows as people of
different classes feel rapidly destabilized and incapable of com -
prehending or arresting the forces that are changing their ways of
life.94 To cite Cohn’s Pursuit of the Millennium:
In the eschatological fantasies which they had inherited from
the distant past, the forgotten world of early Christianity,
these people found a social myth most perfectly adapted to
their needs ... In each case it occurred under similar
circumstances — when population was increasing, indus -
trialisation was getting under way, traditional social bonds
were being weakened or shattered and the gap between rich
and poor was becoming a chasm. Then in each of these areas
in turn a collective sense of impotence and anxiety and envy
suddenly discharged itself in a frantic urge to smite the
ungodly — and by doing so to bring into being, out of
suffering inflicted and suffering endured, that final Kingdom
where the Saints, clustered around the great sheltering figure
of their Messiah, were to enjoy ease and riches, security and
power for all eternity.95
Final Remarks, on The End
In this article I have considered apocalyptic eschatology in the light
of contemporary calls from different political and social perspec -
tives to ‘return to religion’. A range of contemporary psychological
and twentieth-century philosophical literature in particular has
been surveyed, to make the case that a return to apocalypticism
will not serve to promote civic virtue. This form of religious other-
worldliness tendentially pits believers against the existing status
quo, often seeing it as a nest of iniquities. It is characterized by
regressive, over-simplifying Manichean thinking, and charged with
a powerful sense of anger and outrage. Nevertheless, I have made
three arguments as to why it is theoretically one-sided and ethically
ambiguous to simply dismiss apocalyptic religion as ‘mad’ or ‘crazy’
ARENA journal no. 39/40, 2012/2013
Matthew Sharpe226
94 See Weber, ‘Religious Groups’, pp. 441, 467, 473, 485–6, 491–2, 493, 496, 507, 577–9.
95 Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 60.
— on top of the evi dence that this form of religion is today growing
in Australia, the United States and, we add now, also in South
America. The force of the theological and historical arguments was
to suggest that any attempt to wholly ‘other’ this way of thinking
must reconcile itself to the centrality of eschatological, linear con -
ceptions of history, not simply in our monotheistic heritage, but
also carried forward in modern forms of political utopianism.
Finally, I recalled the well-attested sociological identification of
eschatological conviction and social movements with peoples’
sense of social dislocation, disorientation and disempowerment, as
argued by Scholem, Cohn, Weber and others. Apocalypticism, in all
its otherworldly extremes, reflects a lived sense of extreme this-
worldly political and economic alienation. Its present growth globally
must hence be read as a symptom, and perhaps an indictment, of a
world in which global and intranational indices of inequality are
generally increasing, and the pace of technological and economic
change is celebrated almost as an end in itself. While it is surely
impossible to argue rationally against true believers in apocalyptic
ideology, it is equally surely an ethical and political goal to try
within the bounds of possibility to prevent and redress the social
and economic conditions that promote these forms of religious
extremism and intolerance. To do this, we need not posit in a
utopian manner a world in which people will not suffer unjustly,
and perceive themselves to be excluded, disempowered and devoid
of hope, nor one in which those with powerful vested interests will
not oppose the reallocation of resources such reforms will require,
and denounce all such reform as eschatological, crazy and so forth.
There are a series of passages in the Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius’
Meditations that well express the other, non-eschatological, Greek
conception of history we inherit. If you look backwards to the times
of Augustus, Croesus or Pericles, Aurelius observes: 
You will see all these things: people marrying, bringing up
children, sick, dying, warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivat -
ing the ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting,
plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the pre -
sent, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring consulship,
kingly power. Well then, that life of these people no longer
exists at all. 96
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96 Aurelius, Meditations, IV.32; compare Lowith, Meaning in History, pp. 6–10.
Such a perspective seems to me to be the only one that sensibly
allows us to prophecy anything concerning the future, particularly
if — as present conditions certainly suggest — political and eco -
nomic life looks set to become less rather than more stable in the
coming period. In a hundred years, or as long as there are human
beings, it says, there will be people warring, loving, hating, having
children, grieving, heaping up wealth, desiring status and power
— and, let us add, there will also be people who believe that the
world is soon to end.
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